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SOLVING THE FELDSTEIN–HORIOKA PUZZLE WITH
FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
BY YAN BAI AND JING ZHANG1
Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long-term average sav-
ings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first iden-
tified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of
two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where
contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited span-
ning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated
model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of
capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction
needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the
data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to
the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict
capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.
KEYWORDS: Feldstein–Horioka, savings, investment, financial frictions, limited en-
forcement, international capital flows.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE FELDSTEIN–HORIOKA (henceforth FH) puzzle is one of the most robust
empirical regularities in international finance. Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
found that a cross-country regression of average domestic investment rates on
average domestic savings rates results in a large, positive regression coefficient.
Their finding is tightly linked to the empirical observation that net capital flows
across countries are small. Feldstein and Horioka conjectured that the FH co-
efficient should be zero in a frictionless world economy and concluded that
there must be sizeable financial frictions in international capital markets.
Our objective is to quantitatively assess the implications of different financial
frictions on the FH coefficient and the volume of capital flows across countries.
To achieve this, we build a model with a continuum of small open economies.
Each economy is a one-sector production economy that experiences idiosyn-
cratic shocks to its total factor productivity (TFP). We analyze two financial
frictions that are commonly studied in the literature. One is limited enforce-
ment, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties: perma-
1We are grateful for valuable comments and continuous encouragement from Patrick Kehoe,
Timothy Kehoe, Linda Tesar, Richard Rogerson, Berthold Herrendorf, and Chris House. We
thank four anonymous referees and a co-editor for many useful suggestions. For helpful com-
ments, we also thank Cristina Arellano, David Backus, Rui Castro, V. V. Chari, Narayana Kocher-
lakota, Ellen McGrattan, Fabrizio Perri, Vivian Yue, and seminar and conference participants at
Arizona State University, the Cleveland Fed, Florida State University, the Midwest Macroeco-
nomic meeting 2005, the Minneapolis Fed, the NBER IFM November 2005, UBC, UIUC, the
University of Iowa, the University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota, the University of
Montreal, and the University of Texas. All remaining errors are our own.
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nent exclusion from financial markets and a loss in output. The other is limited
spanning, which restricts the set of available assets to noncontingent bonds.2
We find that the interaction of these two frictions generates an FH coefficient
and a volume of capital flows close to the data.
To understand the role of each friction, we first examine the frictionless
model, where a full set of contingent contracts is traded and contracts are fully
enforceable. This model generates substantial capital flows across countries;
the average current-account-to-GDP ratio reaches an average of 62%, much
higher than the 7% observed in the data. The reason is that countries have
a large incentive to borrow and lend so as to smooth consumption and allo-
cate capital stocks efficiently, given the volatility of calibrated TFP shocks. The
large volume of capital flows breaks the link between savings and investment,
and leads to an FH coefficient close to zero.
We then turn to the enforcement model, in which countries trade a full set of
assets but only have a limited capacity to enforce repayment. In this environ-
ment, state-contingent debt limits arise endogenously to ensure that countries
never default on state-contingent liabilities. Given the volatile shock process
and the benefit of trading contingent claims, the default penalties of perma-
nent exclusion and output losses make continuation in international financial
markets highly attractive. Countries therefore have little incentive to default.
Consequently, the model implies large capital flows and a close-to-zero FH co-
efficient. To match the observed FH coefficient, we find that the default penal-
ties have to be close to zero, that is, almost no exclusion from the markets and
no loss in output. With this low default penalty, default incentives are high, and
the volume of capital flows is much lower than that in the data. We conclude
that limited enforcement alone cannot jointly reproduce the FH coefficient
and the capital flows in the data.
We next consider the bond model, in which the spanning of assets is lim-
ited to a noncontingent bond. We follow the literature in imposing the natural
debt limits to ensure that countries are able to repay without incurring nega-
tive consumption.3 The natural debt limits are quite loose and rarely bind in
equilibrium. As a result, this model generates large capital flows and a coun-
terfactually small FH coefficient. Clearly, as one tightens the debt limits ex-
ogenously, the implied FH coefficient increases. In particular, the bond model
generates the observed FH coefficient when we set the exogenous debt limits
tight enough to produce capital flows close to the data.
Our work shows that limited spanning and limited enforcement combine
to endogenously reduce the volume of capital flows to a level consistent with
the data. When countries trade noncontingent bonds with an option to de-
fault, endogenous debt limits are highly restrictive for two reasons. First, these
2Limited enforcement has been studied by Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996),
and Kehoe and Perri (2002), among others. Limited spanning has been studied by Mendoza
(1991), Aiyagari (1994), and Baxter and Crucini (1995), among others.
3See Aiyagari (1994) and Zhang (1997).
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debt limits have to ensure that countries prefer to repay, even under the worst
realization of the TFP shock. Second, the benefits of staying in the markets
are considerably lower when the only available asset is a noncontingent bond.
Countries thus have a greater incentive to default, implying that the debt lim-
its are tighter. These tight debt limits lead to a volume of capital flows of 10%
and an FH coefficient close to that found in the data. They also help produce
a degree of international risk sharing, cross-country dispersions of savings and
investment rates, and time-series volatilities of output, consumption, and net
exports close to those found in the data.
It is well known that savings and investment data are highly correlated not
only across countries, but also in the time series of a given country.4 Our work
demonstrates that the cross-country correlation, not the time-series correla-
tion, helps evaluate the significance of financial frictions. All of our models pro-
duce a positive time-series correlation independently of financial frictions be-
cause both savings and investment respond positively to persistent TFP shocks.
This is consistent with the findings of Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Mendoza
(1991). The cross-country correlation, however, does depend on financial fric-
tions, which affect the ability of countries to borrow and the degree of diver-
gence between the average savings and investment rates.
Our work builds on Castro (2005), who demonstrated that the bond model
can explain the FH finding when exogenous debt limits are calibrated to match
the observed capital flows. While this is an important contribution, Castro’s
analysis leaves the source of the debt limits unexplained. The contribution of
our work is to identify one potential source for these required debt limits: the
interaction of the limited spanning and limited enforcement frictions. Under-
standing the source of debt limits is important if one is interested in how sav-
ings, investment, and capital flows respond to changes in default penalties or
contracting technologies.
Our work is closely related to Kehoe and Perri (2002). They found that lim-
ited enforcement severely restricts capital flows when default penalties con-
sist of permanent exclusion from financial markets but no drop in output. In
contrast, we find under the same default penalties that limited enforcement
barely restricts capital flows. The difference comes from two sources. First,
our shock process is more volatile than theirs. We calibrate to TFPs of both
developed and developing countries, while they calibrate to those of devel-
oped countries only. Second, our multicountry model offers more insurance
opportunities than their two-country model. Thus, in our model, there is both
a greater need and a greater opportunity to insure, which leads to larger capital
flows.
Our two-friction model builds on Zhang (1997), who studied endogenous
debt limits in a pure exchange economy. In his setup, the debt limits depend
only on exogenous endowment shocks and are independent of agents’ choices.
4Tesar (1991) documented that savings and investment are highly correlated over time.
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In contrast, in our production economy, the debt limits depend on both ex-
ogenous shocks and endogenous capital stocks. Thus, countries affect the debt
limits they face through their choices of capital stocks.5
Relative to the vast empirical literature, there are few theoretical studies
on the FH finding. Westphal (1983) argued that the FH finding is due to offi-
cial capital controls. This finding, however, has persisted even after the wide-
spread dismantling of capital controls. Obstfeld (1986) argued that population
growth might generate a savings–investment comovement in a life-cycle model.
Summers (1988), however, showed that the FH finding persists even after
controlling for population growth. Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-I-Martin (1995)
showed in a deterministic model that the savings and investment rates are per-
fectly correlated under full capital mobility after countries reach steady states.
We instead show in a stochastic model that these two rates are uncorrelated
under full capital mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 confirms the FH find-
ing with updated data. Section 3 shows that the FH puzzle can be resolved by
combining limited spanning and limited enforcement. In Section 4, we study
each friction in isolation. We conclude in Section 5. The Supplemental Mater-
ial (Bai and Zhang (2010)) comprises two technical appendixes.
2. THE PUZZLE CONFIRMED
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found a positive correlation between long-
term savings and investment rates across countries. This finding is interpreted
as a puzzle relative to a world with a frictionless financial market, which is
an assumption behind most of the models in international economics. In this
section, we reexamine the Feldstein–Horioka finding with updated data and
show that the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle still exists today.
In their seminal paper, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) measured the long-run
cross-country relationship between savings and investment rates by estimating
(I/Y)i = γ0 + γ1(S/Y)i + εi(1)
where Y is gross domestic product (GDP), S is gross domestic savings (GDP
minus private and government consumption), I is gross domestic investment,
and (S/Y)i and (I/Y)i are period averages of savings rates and investment
rates for each country i. All the variables are in nominal terms. Feldstein and
Horioka took the long-period averages of these rates to handle the cyclical
endogeneity of savings and investment rates. The constant term γ0 captures
the impact of the common shocks that affect all the countries on the world
5Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2010) studied a similar model but with aggregate production.
The endogenous borrowing constraints depend on shocks and aggregate capital stock, and thus
are independent of agents’ choices.
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average savings and investment rates.6 The coefficient γ1 tells us whether high-
saving countries are also high-investing countries on average.
Obviously, the regression coefficient γ1 should be one in a world with closed
economies because domestic investment must be fully financed by domestic
savings. Feldstein and Horioka argued that γ1 should be zero in a world with-
out financial frictions. Based on a sample of 16 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries7 over the 15-year period
from 1960 to 1974, they found that γ1 is 0.89 with a standard error of 0.07.
They interpreted this finding as evidence of a high degree of financial frictions.
The Feldstein–Horioka finding stimulated a large empirical literature that
attempted to refute the puzzle by studying different data samples and periods,
by adding other variables to the original ordinary least squares regression, or
by using different estimation methods. Across empirical studies, however, the
FH coefficient has remained large and significant, although it has tended to
decline in recent years (see Coakley, Kulasi, and Smith (1998) for a detailed
review).
We confirm the Feldstein–Horioka finding using a data set with 64 coun-
tries for the period 1960–2003.8 We find that the FH coefficient is 0.52 with
a standard error of 0.06. Although lower than the original estimate, it is still
positive and significantly different from zero. These results are robust to dif-
ferent subgroups of countries and subperiods (see Table I).9 Thus, the positive
long-run correlation between savings and investment rates remains a pervasive




Group of Countries 1960–2003 1960–1974 1974–2003
Full sample (64 countries) 0.52 (0.06) 0.60 (0.07) 0.46 (0.05)
Subsample (16 OECD countries) 0.67 (0.11) 0.61b (0.11) 0.56 (0.13)
aThe term s.e. refers to the standard error.
bThe new data source produces an FH coefficient different from Feldstein and Horioka’s original estimate for the
same sample. See Appendix A.3 for details.
6For more discussion, see Frankel (1992).
7These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
8For a detailed description of data, see Appendix A.
9To compare with the Feldstein–Horioka result, we take two subperiods (1960–1974 and 1974–
2003) and two subgroups of countries (16 OECD countries and the rest of the countries).
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TABLE II
CROSS-COUNTRY SAVINGS, INVESTMENT, AND CAPITAL FLOWSa
Standard
Mean Deviation Correlation Capital Flows
S/Y I/Y S/Y I/Y (S/Y I/Y) (S/Ygy ) (I/Ygy ) CA/Y (std) TA/Y (std)
0.21 0.22 0.07 0.04 0.77 0.31 0.47 0.07 (0.04) 0.49 (0.29)
agy denotes average growth of real GDP per worker, CA/Y denotes the average absolute current-account-to-GDP
ratio, and TA/Y denotes the average absolute foreign-asset-position-to-GDP ratio. The term std refers to the standard
deviation across countries.
To further understand the FH finding, we decompose the FH coefficient γ1
as
γ1 = cor((S/Y)i (I/Y)i) std((I/Y)i)std((S/Y)i) (2)
where cor denotes the correlation and std denotes the standard deviation. We
report the correlation between the average savings and investment rates and
their standard deviations across countries in Table II. The average savings rate
has a larger standard deviation than the average investment rate: 0.07 versus
0.04. These two rates have a correlation of 0.77. In addition, we find that coun-
tries that grow faster not only invest more, but also save more on average. In
particular, the correlation of the average growth rate of GDP per worker with
the average investment rate is 0.47 and that with the average savings rate is
0.31. The sample mean of the savings rates is close to that of the investment
rates, both of which are around 20%.
Another way to examine the Feldstein–Horioka finding is by looking at dif-
ferences between domestic savings and investment rates. A frictionless inter-
national financial market should allow domestic investment rates of countries
to diverge widely from their savings rates. In the data, however, differences be-
tween savings and investment rates have not been large for most of the coun-
tries. The average of the absolute current-account-to-GDP ratios, referred to
as the capital flow ratio for simplicity, is 7% for the 64 countries over the full pe-
riod, as shown in Table II. The average of the absolute foreign-asset-position-
to-GDP ratios is 49%. International financial markets over this period do not
seem to have enabled countries to reap the long-run gains from intertemporal
trade.
3. A SOLUTION FROM TWO FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
Feldstein and Horioka interpreted their finding as an indication of a high de-
gree of financial frictions. An open question is what kinds of financial frictions
can explain the finding quantitatively. To address this question, we study two
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types of financial frictions. One is limited spanning, where countries are limited
to trading one noncontingent asset. The other is limited enforcement of con-
tracts, where contracts are enforced by the threat of a reversion to costly finan-
cial autarky. We find that the model with both frictions (labeled as the bond-
enforcement model) can solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle quantitatively.
3.1. The Model Environment
Following Clarida (1990), we consider a continuum of small open economies
to study a large number of countries in a tractable fashion. All economies pro-
duce a homogeneous good that can be either consumed or invested. Each
economy consists of a production technology and a benevolent government
that maximizes utility on behalf of a continuum of identical domestic con-
sumers. Countries face idiosyncratic shocks in their production technologies.
The world economy has no aggregate uncertainty.
The production function is the standard Cobb–Douglas AKαL1−α, where A
denotes total factor productivity (TFP), K is capital, and L is labor. TFP has
two components: one is a deterministic growth component that increases at
rate ga, is common across countries, and is constant across periods; the other
is a country-specific idiosyncratic shock a, which follows a Markov process with
finite support and transition matrix Π. The history of the idiosyncratic shock is
denoted by at and the probability of at , as of period 0, is denoted by π(at). We
normalize each country’s allocations by its labor endowment and the common
deterministic growth rate (1 + ga)1/(1−α). The production function can thus be
simplified to akα, where lowercase letters denote variables after normalization.
Each country s0 is indexed by its initial idiosyncratic TFP shock, capital stock,
and asset holding: (a0k0 b0).
International financial markets are characterized by two frictions. One is
limited spanning: the menu of available assets is restricted to noncontingent
bonds. The other is limited enforcement: countries have the option to default
and the extent to which countries can be penalized is restricted to a reversion
to costly financial autarky. When countries have an option to repudiate their
obligations, there must be some penalty for debt default to give borrowers an
incentive to repay. Following the sovereign debt literature, we assume that debt
contracts are enforced by exclusion from international financial markets as in
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and an associated drop in output as in Bulow and
Rogoff (1989).
In such an environment, the government in each country s0 chooses a se-
quence of feasible allocations of consumption, capital stocks, and noncontin-
gent bonds, denoted by x = {c(at)k(at) b(at)}, to maximize a continuum of
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where β denotes the discount factor and u denotes utility which satisfies the
usual Inada conditions.10 Any feasible allocation must satisfy the budget con-
straints, the enforcement constraints, the natural debt limits, and the nonnega-
tivity constraints on consumption and capital. The budget constraints are given
by
c(at)+ k(at)− (1 − δ)k(at−1)+ b(at)≤ atk(at−1)α +Rtb(at−1)(4)
where Rt is the risk-free interest rate and δ is the per-period depreciation rate
of capital.
The enforcement constraints capture the limited enforcement friction and
require that the continuation utility must be at least as high as autarky utility
for each possible future shock, that is,
U(at+1x)≥ V AUT(at+1k(at)) for any at+1
(5)







where π(aτ|at+1) denotes the conditional probability of aτ given at+1. The au-








subject to nonnegativity constraints (c(aτ)k(aτ) ≥ 0) and budget constraints
given by
c(aτ)+ k(aτ)− (1 − δ)k(aτ−1)≤ (1 − λ)aτk(aτ−1)α
for any τ ≥ t + 1, with k(at) given. Here the penalty parameter λ represents a
drop in output associated with defaulting on debt, which has been extensively
documented in the sovereign debt literature; see Tomz and Wright (2007) and
Cohen (1992). Two possible channels lead to output drops after default. One
is the disruption of international trade and the other is the disruption of do-
mestic financial systems. Either disruption could lead to output drops if either
trade or banking credit is essential for production. We follow the sovereign
debt literature and model the output loss exogenously.
10We drop the country index s0 for simplicity of notation when doing so does not cause any
confusion.
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In the spirit of Aiyagari (1994), we impose the natural debt limits to ensure
that countries are able to repay even under the lowest shock without incurring
negative consumption:
b(at)≥ −D(k(at))(6)
where D(k(at)) = (ak(at)α + (1 − δ)k(at))/(R − 1) and a is the lowest po-
tential TFP shock. In the presence of the enforcement constraints, the natural
debt limits never bind in equilibrium. We impose these limits to rule out the
Ponzi scheme that does not violate the enforcement constraints.
3.2. Equilibrium and the Solution Strategy
An equilibrium in the bond-enforcement model is a sequence of prices {Rt}
and allocations {c(at), k(at), b(at)} such that allocations solve each country’s






π(at)[c(at s0)+ k(at s0)
− (1 − δ)k(at−1 s0)− atk(at−1 s0)α] = 0

Since our model has no aggregate uncertainty, interest rates are constant under
an invariant distribution. Given the interest rate R, each country’s problem,
labeled original problem, is to maximize utility given by (3) subject to the budget
constraints (4), the enforcement constraints (5), the natural debt limits (6), and
the nonnegativity constraints on consumption and capital.
The optimal allocation in the original problem is different from a compet-
itive equilibrium where consumers decide on borrowing, since the consumers
fail to internalize the impact of their choices on nationwide debt limits. This
point was made by Jeske (2006). To decentralize the optimal allocation, we
can impose taxes or subsidies on foreign borrowing and lending of each con-
sumer in a competitive setting, similarly to Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Wright
(2006).11
To compute the equilibrium, we restate our original problem recursively as







c + k′ − (1 − δ)k+ b′ ≤ akα +Rb(7)
11For details see Bai and Zhang (2010).
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ck′ ≥ 0 b′ ≥ −D(k′)(8)
W (a′k′ b′)≥ V AUT(a′k′) ∀a′

This technical approach is similar to the approach used in Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1990),12 with one key difference in that our problem is dynamic
rather than repeated. Capital and bond holdings are endogenous state vari-
ables that alter the set of feasible allocations in the following period. Thus, they
not only affect the current utility, but also the future prospects in the continu-
ation of the dynamic problem. Nonetheless, we show that the original problem
can be restated in such a recursive formulation following Atkeson (1991).13
We solve the P-problem iteratively. In each iteration n, we compute the cor-







subject to the constraints (7), (8), and
Wn−1(a′k′ b′)≥ V AUT(a′k′) for all a′
(10)
One feature of this algorithm is that the domain Sn of Wn needs to be updated
in each iteration. This is because, for Wn to be well defined, the set of feasible
allocations that satisfy the constraints (7), (8), and (10) needs to be nonempty
for each state (akb) ∈ Sn. Clearly, this set of feasible allocations depends on
the continuation welfare Wn−1. In particular, when Wn−1 decreases, some states
(akb) cannot find any feasible allocations. Thus, a smaller domain can be
supported.
We now describe the details of our iterative algorithm. We start with a value
of W0 that is sufficiently high and a sufficiently large set of states S0. Specifically,
we set S0 to include all the states under which the set of allocations that satisfy
the constraints (7) and (8) is nonempty. We set W0 as the optimal welfare in the
P-problem under the constraints (7) and (8) only. For each n≥ 1, we construct
Sn given Wn−1 to include all the states that permit a nonempty set of feasible
allocations. The associated welfare function Wn on Sn is constructed according
to (9). Both sequences of {Sn} and {Wn} are decreasing, and converge to the
limits S and W , respectively. The limit W corresponds to the optimal welfare
in the original problem.
12We thank an anonymous referee for directing us to this alternative solution strategy. Rel-
ative to our original one, this approach improves computation efficiency. For details on both
approaches see Bai and Zhang (2010).
13The model in Atkeson (1991) had a complete set of assets and private information, while our
model has incomplete markets and complete information. Despite these differences, the adapta-
tion of his approach is straightforward.
SOLVING THE FELDSTEIN–HORIOKA PUZZLE 613
We compute the equilibrium of the bond-enforcement model as follows. We
start with an initial guess of the interest rate R. We then follow the above iter-
ative algorithm to compute the optimal welfare W and the associated optimal
decision rules. We next find the invariant distribution and calculate the excess
demand in the bond markets under this interest rate R. We finally update the
interest rate and repeat the above procedures until the bond markets clear.
3.3. Calibration
To quantitatively evaluate the FH coefficient in the bond-enforcement
model, we calibrate the model parameters. Countries share all parameter val-
ues that describe tastes and technology, and differ only in their shock real-
izations. As is standard in the literature, we adopt the constant elasticity of
substitution utility function u(c)= (c1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ), where the risk aversion
parameter σ is chosen to be 2. The discount rate β is calibrated to be 0.89 to
match the U.S. average real capital return of 4% per annum. The technology
parameters are set to match U.S. equivalents: the capital depreciation rate δ is
set at 10% per annum, and the capital share α is set at 0.33.
The benchmark default penalties are permanent exclusion from financial
markets and a loss in output. We set the output drop parameter λ at 1.4%,
following Tomz and Wright (2007). Given the importance of the default penal-
ties, in the next section we conduct a wide range of the sensitivity analysis. In
particular, we experiment with different values of the output drop parameter
and allow for partial exclusion under which countries can regain access to in-
ternational financial markets with some probability each period after default.
Calibration of the world TFP process requires a rich stochastic process to
capture the key features of the TFP series for a large number of countries.
Using the standard growth accounting method, we compute a TFP series for
each country.14 We take out the common deterministic trend of 1.01% from
the logged TFP series.
There are three key features of the 64 TFP series. First, there is a wide range
of TFP levels across countries. For example, the average TFP difference be-
tween the United States and Senegal is more than 13 times the cross-country
average of time-series standard deviations. Second, TFPs of poor countries are
generally more volatile than those of rich countries, as shown in Figure 1(a).
The mean of the coefficients of variation of the TFP series is 0.02 for OECD
countries and is 0.04 for developing countries. Third, TFPs for some coun-
tries have different characteristics during different subperiods, as shown in
Figure 1(b). For example, Peruvian TFP shows an abrupt change in 1980: its
coefficient of variation and the mean are 0.02 and 3.8 before 1980, and 0.05
and 3.5 after 1980.
14For details, see Appendix B.
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FIGURE 1.—Key features of the TFP processes.
To generate the features of the TFP series in the data, we specify the world
productivity process as a stochastic regime-switching process. We assume that
the world has three regimes, each of which is captured by its mean, persistence,
and standard deviation of innovations {(μjρj νj)}j=123.15 The TFP shock ait
of country i at period t in regime j follows an autoregressive process
ait = μj(1 − ρj)+ ρjait−1 + νjεit(11)
where εit is independently and identically distributed, and drawn from a stan-
dard normal distribution. At period t + 1, country i has some probability of
switching to another regime, governed by the transition matrix P .
Finally, we use maximum likelihood to estimate all the parameters. The esti-
mation algorithm, described in Appendix B, is an extension of the expectation
maximization (EM) principle of Hamilton (1989). Table III reports parameter
estimates and standard errors. For convenience, the regimes will be referred to
as the low, middle, and high regimes according to their conditional means. All
three regimes are persistent with ρ around 0.99. The middle regime is more
volatile than the other two regimes. Switching between regimes mimics abrupt
changes of some countries’ TFP processes in the data, such as those of Iran and
Peru. The regime-switching process successfully replicates the key features of
the cross-country TFP series.
15The three-regime specification greatly improves the goodness of fit over the two-regime spec-
ification, while introducing another regime barely improves the goodness of fit. For tractability,
we choose the three-regime specification.
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TABLE III
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE WORLD PRODUCTIVITY PROCESSa
Switching Probability P
Regime Mean μ Innovation ν Persistence ρ Low Middle High
Low 2.07 (1.08) 0.023 (0.0001) 0.995 (0.003) 0.92 (0.11) 0.04 (0.15) 0.04 (0.08)
Middle 3.46 (0.37) 0.070 (0.0003) 0.987 (0.011) 0.06 (0.06) 0.90 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04)
High 4.58 (0.14) 0.020 (0.0000) 0.981 (0.003) 0.04 (0.14) 0.03 (0.19) 0.93 (0.10)
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.
3.4. Quantitative Results
Now, with the calibrated parameters and the estimated world TFP process,
we can compute the predictions of the bond-enforcement model by simulation.
To be consistent with the empirical data, in each simulation we obtain 64 se-
ries of 44 periods from the invariant distribution. We then compute domestic
savings as output minus consumption and domestic investment as changes in
capital stocks plus capital depreciation. After calculating the average savings
and investment rates, we run the same regression as in equation (1). We sim-
ulate the model 1,000 times. Table IV reports the results, along with compar-
isons to the data and the results from the other models. The bond-enforcement
model generates an FH coefficient of 0.52, significantly different from zero and
similar to that in the data. Thus, this model solves the Feldstein–Horioka puz-
zle.
Our results come from the interaction of limited enforcement and limited
spanning. These two frictions together generate endogenous debt limits on
noncontingent bonds because lenders will not offer a loan that would be de-
faulted on in the next period. In particular, the endogenous debt limits B de-
pend on the current TFP shock a and the next-period capital stock k′ as
B(ak′)≡ min
a′|π(a′|a)>0
{−b̃(a′) :W (a′k′ b̃(a′))= V AUT(a′k′)}

For each (ak′), the debt limit B specifies the maximum amount of debt that
can be supported without default under all future contingencies.
We examine features of the endogenous debt limits. Figure 2(a) plots the
endogenous debt limit function B over capital for the median shock in the
middle-volatility regime. The debt limit is increasing in capital because poor
countries have more incentive to default than rich countries. To interpret the
scale of the debt limits, we also graph them in Figure 2(b) in terms of output.16
16The debt-limit-over-output ratio is not monotonically increasing in capital due to the con-
cavity of the production function. The zigzag pattern in the figure is the result of the numerical
approximation.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON ACROSS MODELSa
Two-Friction Frictionless Enforcement Bond Bond
Data Model Model Model Natural Limits ad hoc Limits


















































































































aCA/Y denotes the average absolute current-account-to-GDP ratio and TA/Y denotes the average absolute
foreign-asset-position-to-GDP ratio. The term std refers to the cross-country variation in the time-series average,
cor denotes the correlation, and s.e. denotes the standard error. RS coeff reports coefficient β1 in the panel regres-
sion:  log cit −  log c̄t = β0 + β1( log yit −  log ȳt ) + uit , where c̄t and ȳt denote the average consumption and
output across countries of date t . TS cor denotes the average time-series correlations between detrended savings and
investment using the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter. Bond ad hoc Limits denotes the bond model with the constraint
(14), where κ is set at 9
8% to match the observed FH coefficient.
These endogenous debt limits overall allow countries to borrow about 30% of
their output on average. As a result, the model generates a capital flow ratio
of 10% and a foreign-asset-to-output ratio of 40%, which are close to their
empirical counterparts of 7% and 49%.
(a) Levels of Debt Limits (b) Ratios of Debt Limits and Output
FIGURE 2.—Endogenous debt limits.
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The endogenous debt limits are key to understanding savings and investment
behavior. Countries with low capital face tight debt limits and cannot borrow
much to invest when they are experiencing good productivity shocks: they have
to save more to invest more. Countries with high capital intend to lend abroad
when they are experiencing bad shocks. Nonetheless, total lending must be
equal to total borrowing in equilibrium. These countries have to invest more
at home because the interest rate decreases to lower their lending incentive.
Consequently, the average savings and investment rates are positively corre-
lated across countries with a correlation of 0.77, the same as that in the data.
Also, the model produces small dispersions of savings and investment rates,
similar to those found in the data; the standard deviations are 0.06 and 0.04,
respectively. Furthermore, the model generates positive correlations between
the output growth and the savings and investment rates, although these corre-
lations are higher than those in the data, as shown in Table IV.
4. THE ROLE OF EACH FRICTION
The bond-enforcement model deviates from the standard complete markets
model in two ways: limited spanning of assets and limited enforcement of debt
contracts. Could we have quantitatively solved the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle
with just one of these? To address this question, we first examine the fric-
tionless complete markets model, then examine the enforcement model where
contingent contracts have limited enforceability, and finally examine the bond
model where assets have limited spanning. Across these models, we maintain
the benchmark parameter values with the exception that the discount factor is
recalibrated in each model to match the interest rate of 4% per annum.17 By
doing so, we highlight the impact of each financial friction, and more impor-
tantly their interaction, on capital flows and the FH coefficient.
4.1. The Complete Markets Model
Feldstein and Horioka conjecture that in a general equilibrium model of a
world economy without financial frictions, the FH coefficient should be zero.
Interestingly, Feldstein and Horioka made their conjecture long before there
existed quantitative stochastic general equilibrium models that could be used
to evaluate it. In this subsection, we verify the Feldstein–Horioka conjecture in
a standard complete markets model.
Under frictionless financial markets, countries trade a complete set of Arrow
securities. The government chooses allocations to maximize (3) subject to the
17The discount factor is calibrated to be 0.96 in the frictionless model, 0.955 in the benchmark
enforcement model, and 0.94 in the bond model with the natural debt limits.






≤ atk(at−1)α + (1 − δ)k(at−1)+ b(at−1 at)
and the no-Ponzi constraints
b(at at+1)≥ −B̄(13)
where b(at at+1) denotes the quantity of Arrow securities that deliver one unit
of consumption if state at+1 is realized next period and q(at at+1) denotes the
price of such Arrow securities. The borrowing limit B̄ > 0 is set so large that
the no-Ponzi constraints never bind in equilibrium. As reported in Table IV,
the complete markets model generates an FH coefficient of –0.01.18 Thus, the
frictionless model produces an FH coefficient close to zero, as Feldstein and
Horioka conjectured.
To understand this result, we first look at investment and savings decisions.
Under a persistent shock process, investment depends on changes of TFP
shocks: a country with a higher average TFP growth rate invests more on av-
erage. Savings depends not on changes, but on levels of shocks: a country with
a higher average TFP level saves more on average. As a result, the average
growth of output is positively correlated with the average investment rate, but
uncorrelated with the average savings rate, as reported in Table IV.
We then examine the two terms of the FH coefficient in equation (2): the
correlation between the average savings and investment rates and their rela-
tive dispersion. The change and the level of our persistent and mean-reversion
process are slightly negatively correlated, which implies a small, negative corre-
lation between the average savings and investment rates of –0.09. Additionally,
the relative dispersion of investment and savings is small because the change
has a smaller dispersion than the level under the persistent shock process. Con-
sequently, the frictionless model produces an FH coefficient close to zero. Ad-
ditionally, the savings dispersion in the frictionless model is much larger than
that in the two-friction model: 0.41 versus 0.06, which implies that the two fric-
tions have substantial impacts on limiting capital flows across countries.
This analysis shows that the size of the FH coefficient depends on the per-
sistence of the TFP process. As the persistence decreases, the correlation be-
tween changes and levels of shocks becomes more negative, and the dispersion
18If savings is defined as national savings instead of domestic savings, the FH coefficient will be
zero. The intuition is simple. National income and consumption of each country are constant over
time due to fully diversified portfolios, which leads to constant national savings rates over time.
Investment, however, varies with TFP shocks over time. Thus, average national savings rates and
average investment rates are uncorrelated across countries.
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of changes relative to levels rises. Thus, the correlation between the average in-
vestment and savings rates becomes more negative, and the relative dispersion
of the two rates rises with lower persistence. As a result, the FH coefficient
becomes more negative. To illustrate this point, we vary the persistence pa-
rameter of an AR(1) process, where the innovation standard deviation is set
at 4.2% to match the unconditional standard deviation of the TFP data. When
persistence falls from 0.999 to 0.5, the FH coefficient falls from –0.001 to –0.12,
but the FH puzzle remains.
The frictionless model generates a large capital flow ratio, 62%, which is
about 9 times that in the data. The average foreign-asset-position-to-GDP ratio
is also large, 6.12, which is about 12 times that in the data. Furthermore, the
pattern of capital flows deserves some attention. Rich, fast-growing countries
on average both invest and save a lot, while poor, stagnant countries on average
both invest and save little. Even under complete markets, these two types of
countries have relatively low capital flows. Rich, stagnant countries on average
save a lot but invest little, and poor, miracle countries on average save little but
invest heavily. Thus, capital flows generally move from rich, stagnant to poor,
miracle countries. This prediction is not observed in the data, as pointed out
by Lucas (1990).
4.2. The Enforcement Model
We now examine the enforcement model. It allows a complete set of assets
to be traded, but international financial contracts have limited enforceability.
Formally, each country chooses an allocation x = {c(at)k(at) b(at at+1)} to
maximize its welfare given by (3), subject to the budget constraints (12), the
no-Ponzi constraints (13), and the enforcement constraints (5).19 As shown in
Table IV, the enforcement model produces an FH coefficient of –0.01 and a
capital flow ratio of 0.56, which are close to the predictions of the frictionless
model.
In this model, limited enforceability of contracts generates endogenous bor-
rowing limits, which ensure that countries prefer to repay their contingent
claims next period. Figure 3 plots these limits on contingent claims on the
median shock of each regime. Borrowing limits are larger for countries with
larger capital stocks or higher TFP shocks because they have less incentive to
default. Moreover, these state-contingent debt limits are very loose when com-
pared with the noncontingent debt limits in the two-friction model. On aver-
age, countries can borrow three times their income. This is because continued
participation in financial markets is so attractive that countries have little in-
centive to default under the rich asset structure and the volatile shock process.
19Solving the enforcement model is computationally intensive. In addition to transforming the
enforcement constraints recursively, we also need to deal with the curse of dimensionality that
arises under state-contingent assets. We adapt the approach proposed by Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) to compute this model. For details, see Zhang (2005).
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FIGURE 3.—Comparison of endogenous debt limits.
The enforcement model thus generates a capital flow ratio of 0.56 and a ratio
of foreign asset and output of 4.1, both of which are much higher than those in
the data.
Under these large debt limits, the response of investment to shocks is similar
to that found in the frictionless model; the correlation of the investment rate
with output growth is 0.83. Savings starts to respond slightly to the changes of
shocks; the correlation between the savings rate and output growth remains
low at 0.10. Consequently, savings and investment rates remain almost uncor-
related, and the relative dispersion of the investment and savings rates is still
small, as in the frictionless model. As a result, the enforcement model gener-
ates an FH coefficient close to zero.
Default penalties play an important role in determining capital flows under
limited enforcement; lenient penalties increase the default incentive and thus
reduce borrowing and lending. We conduct a sensitivity analysis on default
penalties to examine the robustness of our results. We start with the output
drop parameter. As shown in Table V, a smaller output drop reduces capi-
tal flows and drives up the FH coefficient, but the effects are quantitatively
small. Even under a zero output drop, the enforcement model still produces
an FH coefficient close to zero and a large volume of capital flows. In contrast,
Kehoe and Perri (2002) found that this default penalty leads to small capital
flows. The difference comes from two sources. First, our shock process is more
volatile than theirs. We calibrate to TFPs of both developed and developing
countries while they calibrate to those of developed countries only. Second,
our multicountry model offers more insurance opportunities than their two-
SOLVING THE FELDSTEIN–HORIOKA PUZZLE 621
TABLE V
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL
Output Loss λ Reentry Probability η
λ = 2
0% λ = 0
9% λ = 0% η = 20% η= 40% η= 100%





























aThe term s.e. refers to the standard error.
country model. Thus, in our model, there is both a greater need and a greater
opportunity to insure, which leads to larger capital flows.
We next relax the assumption of permanent exclusion from international
financial markets after default. To give the enforcement model the best chance
of matching the data, we shut down the output drop so as to generate the
highest possible FH coefficient. The default welfare on the right hand side of
the enforcement constraints becomes






π(a′|a)((1 −η)V D(a′k′)+ηW (a′k′0))
subject to c+k′ − (1−δ)k≤ akα, where η denotes the reentry probability and
W denotes the market welfare of the enforcement model.
Table V reports the results for different reentry probabilities. As the reen-
try probability η increases, capital flows decrease and the FH coefficient in-
creases. Even when η approaches 100%, the enforcement model still generates
an FH coefficient much lower than that found in the data. The capital flow ra-
tio and the dispersions of the savings and investment rates, however, are much
lower than those found in the data. To produce the observed FH coefficient,
we would need an even lower default penalty: countries can access the markets
with some probability in the defaulting period and with certainty in the next pe-
riod. This seems unrealistic. Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) documented
that, on average, defaulting countries are excluded from international financial
markets for 5 years, which implies an η of 20%. Moreover, capital flows and
dispersions of savings and investment rates would be even lower.
The enforcement model has a counterfactual implication when the reentry
probability is high: countries hit with bad shocks might respond by increasing
capital and investment. The reason is as follows. In this model, the demand
for capital decreases when shocks are bad or when enforcement constraints
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are binding. With contingent assets, the enforcement constraints tend to bind
under good shocks and relax under bad shocks. Bad shocks thus have two ef-
fects: they decrease capital due to lower returns, but increase capital due to
the relaxation of the enforcement constraints. Hence, capital and investment
might increase when countries are hit with bad shocks if the effect of relaxing
the binding enforcement constraints is large enough.
This counterfactual implication helps explain why the FH coefficient re-
mains small under high reentry probabilities. As the reentry probability in-
creases, enforcement constraints tighten and capital flows decrease, thereby
increasing the savings–investment correlation across countries. This increase
in the correlation is dampened by the counterfactual implication as follows.
Consider a country that increases investment when hit by a bad shock. Its in-
vestment is high, but output and savings are low. Moreover, savings tends to
decrease by more than output due to the incentive of consumption smoothing.
Thus, this country has a high investment rate and a low savings rate in response
to the bad shock. These responses are large enough to lead to a high average
investment rate and a low average savings rate. This lowers the standard de-
viation of the average investment rate and the savings–investment correlation
across countries, and dampens the increase in the FH coefficient.
Note that in these experiments we assume that defaulting countries have
debt fully written off and are treated the same after reentry as countries that
have never defaulted. In the data, the default penalties are more severe be-
cause these assumptions are violated. Defaulting countries have only partial
debt relief and need to repay a nonnegligible fraction of their outstanding debt
when reentering the market.20 In addition, though defaulting countries regain
access to markets, they may have only limited access and face a higher cost of
borrowing relative to nondefaulting countries. If we enrich the enforcement
model further along these dimensions, the default penalty will increase, which
loosens borrowing limits and lowers the FH coefficient.
4.3. The Bond Model
We next examine the bond model, where countries can trade only noncon-
tingent bonds. To isolate the role of limited spanning, we impose natural debt
limits, which ensure that countries are able to repay without incurring negative
consumption. These debt limits are loose enough such that only a small frac-
tion of countries bind at the constraints in equilibrium. Formally, each country
maximizes welfare given by (3) subject to the budget constraints (4) and the
natural debt limits (6). As shown in Table IV, the bond model with the natural
debt limits produces a small FH coefficient of 0.05 and a large capital flow ratio
of 0.38.
20The debt recovery rate is 40% for Ecuador’s 1999 default, 36.5% for Russia’s 1998 default,
and 28% for Argentina’s 2001 default.
SOLVING THE FELDSTEIN–HORIOKA PUZZLE 623
The investment behavior in the bond model is similar to that in the friction-
less model because of the large debt limits. Savings behavior in this model,
however, is different due to precautionary motives under incomplete markets;
countries tend to save more when the TFP shock increases. Thus, the corre-
lation between the average savings rate and average output growth increases
from zero in the frictionless model to 0.41 in the bond model, and similarly
for the correlation between the average rates of savings and investment. De-
spite the increases in the correlation between these two rates, the dispersion
of the savings rate is still much larger than that of the investment rate: 0.34
versus 0.04. This is because the amount of borrowing is virtually unrestricted:
the foreign-asset-position-to-GDP ratio is 5.6, which is much higher than 0.49
in the data. As a result, the bond model with the natural debt limits implies a
counterfactually small FH coefficient.
Most of the literature with incomplete markets imposes ad hoc debt limits.
When these limits are tightened exogenously, the bond model can generate
the observed FH coefficient. This was shown by Castro (2005), who restricted
countries to borrow no more than a fraction κ of their resources at the begin-
ning of the period:
b(at)≥ −κ(atk(at−1)α + (1 − δ)k(at−1)+Rtb(at−1))(14)
We conduct a similar analysis in the bond model. We find that when κ is set at
9
8%, the bond model reproduces the observed FH coefficient. As reported in
Table IV, the bond model under the constraint (14) produces similar implica-
tions as the bond-enforcement model.
Castro’s analysis shows that we need debt limits to be severe enough to re-
strict capital flows close to the data to resolve the FH puzzle. Although this
is an important contribution, Castro’s analysis leaves the source of the bor-
rowing constraints unexplained. Our work suggests that the interaction of the
two financial frictions could be a potential source for these required borrowing
constraints. Moreover, our analysis is useful for predicting the effects on sav-
ings, investment, and capital flows if there is a change in default penalties or
contracting technologies.
4.4. Interaction of Two Frictions
The key reason that the two-friction model can solve the FH puzzle is that
the interaction of the two frictions generates tight endogenous debt limits to
restrict capital flows close to the data. As shown in Figure 3, the enforcement
model under the benchmark default penalties generates loose state-contingent
debt limits, which ensure repayments if the contingency occurs. When limited
spanning is also introduced, the debt limits become noncontingent to ensure
that countries prefer to repay, even under the worst realization of shocks.
Clearly, the noncontingent debt limits are tighter than the contingent ones.
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Moreover, market welfare is lower in the two-friction model than in the en-
forcement model because limited spanning restricts trading opportunities, al-
though the autarky utilities are the same across these two models. Countries
thus have larger incentive to default in the two-friction model than in the en-
forcement model. As a result, the debt limits are further tightened in the pres-
ence of both frictions.
In addition, the two-friction model does not have the counterfactual invest-
ment behavior in the enforcement model, even when the debt limits are tight.
The key is that limited spanning makes repayments noncontingent. Repay-
ments are more painful under bad shocks with lower income, and thus the
enforcement constraints tend to bind when countries are hit with bad shocks.
Therefore, investment tends to decrease in response to bad shocks as in the
data. Absence of the counterfactual implication helps explain why the two-
friction model can generate the observed FH coefficient, while the enforce-
ment model cannot under the same capital flow ratio.
The interaction of the two frictions improves the model’s quantitative per-
formance along four dimensions over the frictionless model, the enforcement
model, and the bond model with the natural debt limits. First, the two-friction
model produces a capital flow ratio close to that in the data, while the other
three models generate ratios at least 5 times that in the data (see Table IV).
Second, the two-friction model generates an observed dispersion of average
savings rates of 0.06, while the other three models generate a dispersion at
least 4 times that found in the data. Third, the two-friction model produces a
correlation between average savings and investment rates almost the same as
that in the data, while this correlation is much lower in the other three mod-
els. Last, the two-friction model generates an average savings rate closest to
the data, although it underperforms with regard to the average investment
rate. The two-friction model has implications in these dimensions similar to
the bond model with the exogenous debt limits, which are calibrated to match
the observed FH coefficient.
The interaction of the two frictions also helps account for the imperfect risk
sharing that is in the data. The empirical literature commonly measures the
degree of risk sharing as the coefficient on output growth in a panel regression
of consumption growth on output growth. As shown in Table IV, international
risk sharing is far from perfect empirically, which is completely at odds with
the perfect risk sharing prediction of the complete markets model. The en-
forcement model and the bond model with the natural debt limits still provide
too much risk sharing relative to the data. With the tight debt limits, the bond-
enforcement model greatly reduces risk sharing across countries and generates
a degree of risk sharing that is much closer to that found in the data.
We now examine the impact of default penalties in the two-friction model.
When the output loss parameter λ is zero, permanent exclusion from financial
markets is the only default penalty. Under this scenario, we find that capi-
tal flows are small and the FH coefficient is large, as shown in Table VI. In
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TABLE VI
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE BOND-ENFORCEMENT MODEL




9% λ = 0% η= 20% η= 40% η= 100%
FH coeff (s.e.)a 0.45 (0.05) 0.61(0.05) 0.94 (0.02) 0.81 (0.04) 0.86 (0.03) 0.93 (0.02)
CA/Y 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02
std(S/Y) 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
std(I/Y) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
cor(S/Y I/Y) 0.72 0.84 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.98
aThe term s.e. refers to the standard error.
contrast, in the enforcement model this default penalty supports large capital
flows and generates a close-to-zero FH coefficient. This is because the exclu-
sion from financial markets is less severe when only noncontingent bonds can
be traded. Thus, to match the observed capital flows, we need the output loss
as part of the default penalties. As the output drop parameter λ rises from 0
to 2%, the FH coefficient decreases from 0.94 to 0.45, but remains large and
positive.
We also experiment with partial exclusion from financial markets in Ta-
ble VI. We set the output loss at the benchmark value of 1.4%. When the
reentry probability is 20%, the model produces a small capital flow ratio of 4%
and a large FH coefficient of 0.81. Capital flows decrease and the FH coeffi-
cient rises as we further increase the reentry probability to make default less
painful. Again, we assume in all these experiments that the defaulting country
has all the debt written off and has full access to the markets upon reentry.
If we further relax these assumptions, the FH coefficient will decrease since
borrowing limits become looser with higher default penalties.
4.5. Time-Series and Cross-Section Predictions
Savings and investment are also positively correlated over business cycles
within a country, as documented by Tesar (1991). The international business
cycle literature shows that the positive time-series savings–investment correla-
tion arises in either a frictionless model or a model with financial frictions.21
We confirm the previous results. Moreover, we highlight that the cross-country
dimension, and not the time-series dimension, of savings and investment data
helps evaluate the significance of financial frictions. Finally, we demonstrate
the success of the two-friction model mechanism in producing key interna-
tional business cycle statistics.
21See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1993), and Mendoza (1991).
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To examine the time-series implications, we must introduce capital adjust-
ment costs, as is standard in international business cycle models, so as to re-
duce the volatility of investment to a level close to that in the data.22 Following
the literature, we specify the capital adjustment cost as χ(kt+1/kt − 1)2kt/2,
where χ is calibrated to match the volatility of investment in the data. The
resource constraints are modified accordingly to reflect the adjustment costs.
We find that all of the models, with or without financial frictions, generate
a positive time-series correlation between savings and investment rates (re-
ported in the last column of Table IV), while the FH coefficients are almost the
same as were estimated before. The result comes from endogenous responses
of savings and investment to the persistent shock process. When hit by a good
shock, a country increases investment to utilize this good production oppor-
tunity and also increases savings to smooth consumption. On the other hand,
when hit by a bad shock, a country reduces both savings and investment. Thus,
savings and investment are positively correlated over time, and this mechanism
is present in each of the models.
Different from the time-series dimension, the cross-section dimension stud-
ies how divergent the long-term average savings and investment rates are for
each country. One can imagine that in a world with a persistent shock process,
each country could have positively correlated savings and investment rates over
time, but might have very different average savings and investment rates. In
this study, we have shown that the degree of divergence depends on the ability
of countries to borrow and lend, which in turn is given by the degree of finan-
cial frictions. This explains why the cross-section dimension helps evaluate the
significance of financial frictions.
We also examine the implications on key international business cycle sta-
tistics of the bond-enforcement model. As reported in Table VII, the bond-
TABLE VII
TIME-SERIES IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOND-ENFORCEMENT MODELa
Volatility Cyclicality International




std(y) cor(c y) cor(i y) cor(
nx
y  y) cor(y y
∗) cor(c c∗)
Data 3.53% 5.59% 1.01 4.08 0.74 0.58 −0.15 0.08 0.05
Model 3.35% 3.18% 0.68 4.04 0.98 0.78 0.09 0.02 0.02
aThe data statistics are calculated from logged (except for net exports and investment) and HP-filtered annual
time series, 1960–2003. The model statistics are averages from 1,000 simulations of 64 series and 44 periods, where
the relevant series have been logged and HP-filtered as in the data series. All statistics are averages across countries.
std denotes the standard deviation, cor denotes the correlation, y denotes output, c denotes consumption, i denotes
investment, and nx denotes net exports. The relative standard deviation of investment and output is computed using
the growth rates, since investment might be negative in the model.
22We did not impose the capital adjustment cost in the enforcement model, due to technical
complexity.
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enforcement model generates fluctuations of output, consumption, and net ex-
ports close to those observed in the data. It also comes close to matching the
cyclical behavior of consumption and investment. In addition, the model gen-
erates a cross-country output correlation that is the same as the consumption
correlation due to limited risk sharing under the tight endogenous debt limits.
These tight constraints, however, also limit the model’s ability to generate the
countercyclicality of net exports found in the data.23
5. CONCLUSION
The Feldstein–Horioka finding of a positive long-run savings–investment
correlation across countries is one of the most robust findings in international
finance. Our work first shows that this finding is a puzzle for the frictionless
(complete markets) model. To our knowledge, this point is new to the litera-
ture. Most existing theoretical studies examine the positive time-series savings–
investment correlation in the data and find this observation can arise even in a
frictionless model as savings and investment comove in response to productiv-
ity shocks. We find, however, that the frictionless model implies a correlation
of zero between the long-run savings and investment rates across countries.
Our work then quantitatively investigates whether plausibly calibrated finan-
cial frictions can explain this finding. We find that a calibrated model with
both limited spanning and limited enforcement frictions produces a savings–
investment correlation and capital flows close to those found in the data. In
contrast, the model with limited enforcement alone cannot jointly produce the
capital flows and the FH coefficient found in the data. The model with lim-
ited spanning produces this finding when we exogenously set debt limits to
restrict the volume of capital flows consistent with the data. The two frictions
together generate such debt limits endogenously through their interaction. In
sum, our work analyzes the roles of different financial frictions in one harmo-
nized framework and highlights the importance of the interaction between the
two frictions.
In this work, the limited enforcement friction endogenizes borrowing con-
straints and links them to the fundamental parameters of the default penalties.
This analysis is useful for predicting international capital flows when the un-
derlying default penalties change. On the other hand, the two-friction model
still assumes that the contracts available are exogenously incomplete and does
not provide a deep reason for debt to be noncontingent. A future extension is
to endogenize the set of contracts available.
Another interesting extension would be to allow for equilibrium default,
since in the data we do observe frequent episodes of sovereign default. In our
bond-enforcement model, default never occurs in equilibrium because the en-
dogenous borrowing constraints ensure that countries repay their debt under
23A similar result is also found in Kehoe and Perri (2002).
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any future contingency. If endogenous debt contracts are instead set to ensure
debt repayments only in expectation, default might occur in equilibrium.24 The-
oretically, equilibrium default could improve welfare by providing state con-
tingency in debt repayments upon default. It is still an open question whether
such an extension could have a significant effect on the savings–investment
correlation.
APPENDIX A: DATA SAMPLE AND SOURCES
In this appendix, we describe our data source, identify the countries in our
sample, and document several important changes in the systems of national
accounts.
A.1. Data Sources
Our nominal data series are from the World Bank’s publication World Devel-
opment Indicators 2007. These include nominal GDP, nominal final consump-
tion, and nominal gross capital formation. Our population and real data series
are from the Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006)). These
series include real GDP per capita (Laspeyres), shares of consumption, gov-
ernment expenditure, and investment. Total employment data are mainly from
data bases compiled by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. The
missing employment data are supplemented by the Penn World Table 6.2 as
employment = real GDP per capita (chained) × population
real GDP per worker (chained)


The data on capital flows are from the data set compiled by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007).
A.2. Country Sample
A total of 98 countries have all relevant data series available for our whole
sample period (1960–2003). We select the ending year to be 2003 because the
Penn World Table 6.2 has missing data for many countries in 2004. We exclude
economies that have a real GDP per capita of less than 4.5% or a popula-
tion of less than 1% of those in the United States in 2000. We also exclude
Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. The 64 countries remaining in
the sample are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
24See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2007), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-
Rull (2007), and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).
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Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe.
A.3. Changes in Systems of National Accounts
Our result for the 16 OECD countries Feldstein and Horioka (1980) used
over 1960–1974 is 0.67, which is different from the estimate of 0.89 found in the
original study because of changes in the systems of national accounts (SNA).
In the data source they used, National Accounts of OECD Countries 1974, the
1953 SNA, and the 1968 SNA are used for these countries. In our data source,
the World Development Indicators 2007, most countries use the 1993 SNA. The
adoption of the 1993 SNA involves many changes. Some changes are simply re-
classifications of items between various components of GDP, but others involve
adding new transactions or suppressing old ones. Among all of the components
of GDP, the largest overall revisions affect gross fixed capital formation. The
1993 SNA broadens the concept of investment to include several types of ex-
penditure that were not formerly considered to be capital spending, such as
spending on computer software and expenditures on mineral exploration, en-
tertainment, and artistic works. The above changes lead to an upward revision
of gross capital formation and to a decrease in the FH coefficient.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF THE WORLD PRODUCTIVITY PROCESS
The TFP level for country i at period t is defined as
logAit = logY it − α logKit − (1 − α) logLit(15)
where Y it is real GDP, K
i
t is the capital stock constructed from gross capital
formation data, and Lit is employment. The average growth rate of the TFP
series of 64 countries ga is 1.01%.
In this appendix, we describe the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm
used to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of parameters in the regime-
switching process specified in (11). This is an extension of the EM principle of





where Ψi = {aiT  aiT−1 
 
 
  ai1} is a vector containing all the observations on
country i’s TFP, Θ = {{μjρj νj}j=123P} denotes the parameters to be esti-
mated, N denotes the number of countries, and T denotes number of periods.
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The density function f is given by
f (Ψ i;Θ) =
∑
mi
f (aiT |miT aiT−1;Θ) · · · f (ai2|mi2 ai1;Θ)
×p(miT |miT−1) · · ·p(mi2|mi1)p(mi1)
where mit denotes the regime that country i is in at period t.
To make computation feasible, we assume the process to be stationary and
restrict ρ ≤ 0
995 in the estimation. Due to the nonlinearity of the maximum
likelihood function, we cannot solve the parameters analytically. Instead, we
use the EM algorithm to solve the maximum likelihood estimates iteratively.
We start with an initial guess of the parameters Θn−1. We then update the con-
ditional probability of each regime in each period for each country using the
Bayes rule. Next, given the conditional probabilities, we compute Θn with the
maximum log-likelihood method. We iterate these procedures until Θn con-
verges.
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